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ABSTRACT
Adaptive systems behaviours can be intuitively programmed,
using rule based middleware, as a set of rules. The rules
verify conditions and perform actions in order to achieve
a set of objectives. However, this raises several problems.
First, inconsistencies may result from the fact that an ac-
tion is not actually performed due to a communication error
or a hardware failure. Second, the rules may be conflicting
and their sequential chaining may lead to undesirable be-
haviour. This paper proposes an approach that combines
transactional and behavioural reliability (i.e. consistency
and no conflict) in adaptive middleware. This approach is
implemented using the middleware LINC and the automata
based language Heptagon/BZR. A case study, in the field of
building automation, is presented to illustrate the approach.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Today’s systems are not only distributed but also adap-
tive: they have to react to their environments in order to
achieve a set of objectives. In this context, policy or rule
based middleware is convenient. It allows to build the con-
sidered system as a set of rules that verify conditions and
perform actions in order to achieve the objectives. However,
this raises several problems. First, it may happen that the
action of a rule is not actually performed due to a commu-
nication error or a hardware failure. Assuming that the ac-
tion is performed leads to an inconsistency: the system state
and its logical representation differ. Second, the rules may
be conflicting and may lead to an undesirable behaviour. A
conflict occurs between several rules when they are activated
at the same instant and have contradictory actions. For in-
stance, a rule that opens a window to ventilate a room can
be conflicting with another rule that limits the noise level
at a given threshold. Therefore, when writing rules, one has
to manually avoid conflicts. This is done by verifying sev-
eral conditions on potentially conflicting rules in order to
prevent them from being activated at the same instant. For
large systems, manually avoiding conflicts between rules is
tedious and error prone.
In distributed systems, inconsistencies are avoided through
distributed consensus [8] or distributed transactions [2]. Con-
flicts between rules can be detected or avoided using tran-
sition systems [3, 15]. For instance, the solution proposed
in [15] is to first model the system using coloured Petri net;
then, to verify the absence of conflicts in the designed model
with a model-checker; and finally, to generate the corre-
sponding rules. However, this approach requires to manually
avoid conflicts in the coloured Petri net models.
This paper proposes to combine transactional and be-
havioural reliability (i.e. consistency and no conflict), as
shown in Figure 1, in the feedback loop execution scheme of
adaptive middleware. Transactional reliability is achieved
using a middleware that supports transactions. Behavioural
reliability is achieved using a transition system.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
background materials. Then, Section 3 details the composi-
tion of execution schemes of both a transactional middleware
(LINC [10]) and a transition system (H/BZR [7]). Section 4
presents a case study, in the field of building automation to
illustrate the proposed approach. Section 5 discusses related
work. Finally, Section 6 concludes and gives future works.
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Figure 1: Transactional and behavioural reliability in adpa-
tive middleware feedback loop execution scheme
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 LINC
LINC [10] is a rule based middleware used to develop and
deploy reactive applications over distributed systems. LINC
is based on three paradigms:
• Associative Memory [4]: It consists in modelling
the system as a distributed set of tuple spaces con-
taining tuples. In LINC, tuple spaces are called bags
and are distributed over different locations. Tuples are
manipulated through three operations: rd, get and put.
The rd is used to verify the presence of a given tuple
in a bag. The get allows to remove a tuple from a bag
and the put is used to insert a tuple. These operations
are used as basic primitives of production rules.
• Production Rules [5]: A production rule consists
of two parts: a precondition and a performance. The
precondition uses the operation rd, with a partially
instantiated tuple as parameter, to verify specific con-
ditions in the system. If these conditions are true, the
performance is triggered. The performance uses the
three operations. The rd is used to verify conditions.
The get and the put are used to perform actions on the
system and update its logical state. The tuples manip-
ulated in the performance must be fully instantiated.
• Distributed Transactions [2]: They are used in the
performance part to ensure the all-or-nothing property.
A transaction allows to group as one operation: the
verification of conditions (rd), the realisation of actions
(put), and the update of the system logical state (get,
put). Thus, the performance part may abort if, for
instance, the verification of a condition through a rd
is no longer true. The performance also aborts if a
put fails because the corresponding action cannot be
performed for a given reason (e.g. hardware failure).
2.1.1 Example of LINC rule
1[ ”S e n s o r s ” ] . r d ( ”p r 1 ” , ”t r u e ”) &
[ ”L o c a t i o n s ” ] . r d ( ”p r 1 ” , ”p r e s e n c e ” , l o c a t i o n ) &
3[ ”L o c a t i o n s ” ] . r d ( lamp1 , ”lamp” , l o c a t i o n ) &
[ ”S t a t e s ” ] . r d ( lamp1 , ”o f f ”)
5: :
{ [ ”S e n s o r s ” ] . r d ( ”p r 1 ” , ”t r u e ”) ;
7[ ”Ac t u a t o r s ” ] . put ( lamp1 , ”sw i t c hon”) ;
[ ”S t a t e s ” ] . ge t ( lamp1 , ”o f f ”) ;
9[ ”S t a t e s ” ] . put ( lamp1 , ”on”) ; } .
Listing 1: LINC rule example
Listing 1 presents an example of rule that switches on the
lamp of a room when a presence is detected. The rule is
composed of two parts: a precondition (before the symbol
::) and a performance (between brackets). The precondition
consists of three rd operations applied on different bags to
verify the presence of tuples. This allows to know: if a pres-
ence is detected by the sensor with the id pr1 (line 1) and
if the lamp of the same room is off (lines 2, 3, 4). If these
conditions are true, the performance is triggered. The per-
formance consists of one transaction that first verifies if the
room is still occupied (line 6), then it switches on the lamp
(line 7) and changes its logical state (lines 8, 9). The perfor-
mance succeeds if all its operations succeed. For instance, if
a communication error occurs in the lamp actuator, the put
at line 7 fails and the performance fails. The logical state
of the lamp is unchanged and is consistent with the lamp
actual state.
2.1.2 Execution of a LINC application
The rules of a LINC application are executed, in parallel,
by distributed rule engines. An engine can execute several
rules. For each rule, the associated engine first executes
the precondition. To do this, the engine evaluates the rd
operations and builds an inference tree with instantiation
and propagation of the variables.
Let us consider the rule example presented in Listing 1.
The engine starts by evaluating the first rd. This rd returns,
one by one, all the tuples of the bag Sensors which match
the pattern ("pr1","True"). If no matching tuple exists,
the rd is blocked and waits for new matching tuples. For
every returned tuple, the engine creates a new branch and
evaluates the next rd (line 2). In the same way, the result
is all the tuples of the bag Locations matching the pattern
("pr1","presence",location). For each tuple returned, a
new branch is created, the variable location is instantiated
and its value is used to evaluate the third rd. This also
returns all the tuples of the bag Locations matching the
pattern (lamp1,"lamp",location). A new branch is cre-
ated, the variable lamp1 is instantiated and its value is used
to evaluate the fourth rd. Whenever a new matching tuple
is added in one of the considered bags, it is returned and a
new branch is created. This allows to react to all the events
occurring in the system when they occur.
The performance is triggered for each branch with a length
equal to four (i.e. number of rd in the precondition). Several
instances of the same performance can be triggered in par-
allel for different branches. The performance is composed of
one transaction executed with a two phase-commit. In the
first phase, pre-operations are performed (pre rd, pre get,
pre put) to see if the operations can actually be done. When
a pre rd or a pre get succeeds, the tuple is locked. Another
transaction which wants to use the same tuple has to wait
until it becomes unlocked. If all the pre-operations succeed,
the second phase of the transaction performs a confirm to
consume (get) (or release (rd)) the locked tuples and insert
the new tuples (put). If one pre-operation fails, the second
phase releases all the locked tuples and nothing is done.
2.2 Heptagon/BZR
Heptagon/BZR or H/BZR [7] is a reactive programming
language used to build systems that react to their environ-
ments. It belongs to the same family as Lustre and Signal [1].
These languages rely on the synchrony hypothesis [1]: a re-
action is assumed faster than the system dynamics. The
reactive behaviour of the system can be sample driven or
event driven [1]. In the first case, a reaction is triggered
periodically (e.g. every 5 seconds). In the second case, a
reaction is triggered each time an event occurs.
2.2.1 Automata-based H/BZR programs
In H/BZR, systems are modelled using automata or equa-
tions. When the considered system is composed of several
entities, each entity is first modelled using an automaton.
Then, the automata are composed, in parallel or in hierar-
chy, to obtain a global automaton that models the whole
system. In this case, a reaction of the system involves a re-
action of all the different entities, at the same instant. It
corresponds to one transition of the global automaton.
H/BZR enables, through a contract mechanism, Discrete
Controller Synthesis (DCS) [12]. DCS is a formal method
used to enforce given objectives on a model. Given a model
that represents all the possible behaviours of a system, DCS
inhibits those that violate the objectives. To do this, DCS
requires to partition the variables in two sets: controllable
and uncontrollable variables. For a given objective (e.g.
avoid undesired or unsafe states), the DCS algorithm ex-
plores the state space of the system and gives appropriate
values to the controllable variables so that the objective is
enforced, whatever the values of the uncontrollable variables.
A basic H/BZR program consists of one block called node.
A node has input and output parameters. It contains the
automaton modelling the system. A node has a contract
part in which are defined the objectives to enforce.
2.2.2 Execution of a H/BZR program
The compilation of a H/BZR program generates a sequen-
tial code in C or Java. In both cases, the generated code
includes a variable that stores the state of the automaton
modelling the system and a step function. The step takes
as parameter a set of inputs, computes the outputs and up-
dates the state of the automaton. One execution of the step
corresponds to one reaction of the system. Therefore, the
step must be correctly executed, by ensuring the synchrony
hypothesis, every time the system has to react to its envi-
ronment. This can be event driven or sample driven.
2.3 Comparison of LINC and H/BZR
To compare LINC and H/BZR, let us consider a room
equipped with two actuators (i.e. a shutter and a lamp).
The room must be controlled to achieve two objectives:
1. if presence, luminosity must be in [500, 600] lux;
2. if confidential meeting, room must be completely closed.
In LINC, the first objective is achieved using two rules:
R1 and R2. R1 opens the shutter if a presence is detected
and the outdoor luminosity is between 500 and 600 lux. R2
switches on the lamp if a presence is detected and the out-
door luminosity is not between 500 and 600 lux. The second
objective is achieved using a rule, R3, that closes the shut-
ter during a confidential meeting. Each rule first verifies a
set of conditions. Then, it sends a specific command to the
target actuator and changes its logical state. LINC, through
transactions, ensures that if a command cannot be sent, the
logical state of the corresponding actuator is not changed.
This prevents from inconsistencies. However, LINC does not
prevent from conflicting rules. For instance, let us consider
the following scenario: presence detected, outdoor luminos-
ity between 500 and 600 lux and confidential meeting held.
In this case, both R1 and R3 are activated to open and close
the shutter at the same instant, leading to a conflict.
In H/BZR, each actuator is first modelled as an automa-
ton by specifying its effects on the environment. Then, the
automata are composed to obtain a global automaton in
which the objectives are enforced through DCS. When ex-
ecuted, the generated step function returns the commands
to send to the actuators and changes the state of the global
automaton. These commands allow to reach both objectives
without conflict. The conflict on the shutter is avoided by
returning the command switch on for the lamp and close
for the shutter. However, the step changes the state of the
automaton before the commands are applied. If the com-
mands cannot be applied for a given reason (e.g. commu-
nication error), the step becomes inconsistent. Indeed the
state of the automaton is different from the actual state of
the actuators.
LINC and H/BZR can be combined to enhance adaptive
systems reliability. LINC ensures the consistency of an ac-
tion and H/BZR prevents from conflicting actions.
3. COMBINING LINC AND H/BZR
The logical behaviour of the considered system is first con-
trolled using Heptagon/BZR and DCS to reach the target
objectives without conflict. Then, the generated step func-
tion is executed by LINC to avoid inconsistencies.
3.1 Design flow
Designers are required to model each entity of the system
as an automaton, by specifying its states, its transitions and
its effects on the environment. Designers also have to for-
malise the target objectives as logical propositions and de-
fine a contract in order to enforce them on the system global
automaton and generate a step function. The step requires
specific data in order to compute the commands. Providing
the step data may require to transform data collected from
the environment, to aggregate them or use them to estimate
the required data. For instance, a CO2 data collected from
the environment can be used to estimate a presence. Data
transformation, aggregation and estimation are not subject
to conflicts and then, can be done using a set of rules. These
rules, as well as the generated step will be executed in LINC.
3.2 Step Execution in LINC
The step function takes as parameter a set of inputs, com-
putes the outputs and changes the state of the automaton
modelling the system. In the same way, the performance of
a LINC rule is used to change the system state. Hence, the
step should be invoked in the performance of a LINC rule.
This rule is written to be triggered each time an event occurs
in the system and then, enables the reactive execution of the
step. The precondition of this rule first collects, from the
environment, data corresponding to the input parameters of
the step. Then, the performance invokes the step. This
is done by applying an operation put on the bag Step that
encapsulates the step function. The pattern of this put in-
cludes instantiated variables (input parameters of the step)
and non instantiated variables to store the step outputs.
This does not comply with the logic of LINC which requires
the variables used in the performance to be instantiated.
To overcome this limitation, the proposed solution is to
first invoke the step in the precondition. This does not
change the state of the automaton, this only instantiates
the variables used to store the step outputs i.e. the com-
mands to send. Then, to invoke the step again in the per-
formance in order to change the automaton state. In this
case, it is necessary to ensure that the two invocations give
the same result. Indeed, if the current state of the automa-
ton changes before the execution of the performance (due to
the execution of another instance of the same rule), the sec-
ond invocation of the step will give another result, different
from the previous one. Hence, the computed outputs will
be no longer valid and must be computed again.
As example, let us consider a room equipped with a lamp
and H/BZR program that maintains the luminosity of this
room between 500 and 600 lux when a presence is detected.
The step generated by the compilation of this program takes
as parameter the value measured by the room presence sen-
sor, returns the command to send to the lamp and changes
the state of the lamp automaton. This step is invoked in
the LINC rule presented in Listing 2.
The precondition of this rule first reads the value mea-
sured by the room presence sensor in the variable presval.
Then, at line 4, the precondition applies a rd operation, with
the partially instantiated tuple (presval, currentState,
command), on the bag Step. This rd invokes the step func-
tion with the instantiated value of presval to compute the
command to send to the lamp. In this invocation, the step
does not change the state of the lamp automaton. It returns
the automaton current state and the computed command
respectively in the variables currentState and command.
At line 7, the performance applies a rd operation on the
bag StepAcess with the pattern ("allowed"). This locks
the tuple ("allowed") during the execution of the trans-
action. Another transaction that wants to use the same
tuple has to wait until it becomes unlocked, at the end of
the current transaction execution. This ensures the syn-
chrony hypothesis: the step function that changes the state
of the automaton will not be invoked in parallel, by several
rules. Finally, the performance applies the operation put
with the pattern (presval, currentState, "") on the bag
Step. This will first verify if the state of the automaton is
still equal to currentState. Then this will invoke the step
function with the value of presval. In this invocation, the
step produces the same command and changes the automa-
ton state. The performance is embedded in one transaction.
It succeeds if all its operations succeed. If one operation
fails, the performance fails and nothing is done. Otherwise,
the command is sent to the lamp and the step that changes
the lamp automaton state is executed. Invoking the step
at the end of the performance ensures that this function is
executed only if all the previous operations succeed. This
prevents from cancelling the execution of the step when the
performance fails because another operation fails.
1[ ”S e n s o r s ” ] . r d ( ”p r 1 ” , p r e s v a l ) &
[ ”L o c a t i o n s ” ] . r d ( ”p r 1 ” , ”p r e s e n c e ” , l o c a t i o n ) &
3[ ”L o c a t i o n s ” ] . r d ( lamp1 , ”lamp” , l o c a t i o n ) &
[ ”Step” ] . r d ( p r e s v a l , c u r r e n t S t a t e , command)
5: :
{ [ ”S e n s o r s ” ] . r d ( ”p r 1 ” , p r e s v a l ) ;
7[ ”StepAcces” ] . r d ( ”a l l ow e d ”) ;
[ ”Ac t u a t o r s ” ] . put ( lamp1 , command) ;
9[ ”Step” ] . put ( p r e s v a l , c u r r e n t S t a t e , ””) ; } .
Listing 2: Step execution in LINC
3.3 Step encapsulation and rule generation
The step function of a H/BZR program is encapsulated
in a LINC bag named Step. This bag can be manipulated
using the operations rd and put as shown in Listing 2. To
implement the rd and the put of the bag Step, the H/BZR
program is first compiled in C. The generated C code in-
cludes a struct named memory (storing the state of the au-
tomaton), the name and the type of each input and output
parameter of the step function. The execution of the step
produces the commands and updates the value of the struct
memory in order to change the state of the automaton.
When applied on the bag Step, the rd copies the struct
memory in another struct named memorycopy and executes
the step function using memorycopy. This allows computing
the commands without changing the state of the automaton
modelling the system behaviour. The computed commands
and the current state of the automaton are returned in two
variables currentState and command. The put on the bag
Step first compares the current value of the struct memory to
currentState (returned by the rd). If they are identical, the
put executes the step using the struct memory to change the
automaton state. Otherwise, the put fails and the trans-
action is not executed. A script is used to automatically
encapsulate the step of a H/BZR program (implement the
rd and the put) and generate the rule that invokes it.
3.4 Discussion on design cost and runtime cost
Controlling the logical behaviour of a system in LINC re-
quires to manually achieve the objectives by first thinking
about all the possible cases and then, writing a set of rules.
These rules can then be distributed for performance or ge-
ographical constraint. However, to avoid conflicts between
rules, it will be required to add additional conditions on sev-
eral rules. At the end, several rules read the same inputs at
the same instant. The rules seem independent but are not.
In LINC combined with H/BZR, controlling the system
logical behaviour just requires to design an automaton for
each entity of the system and formalise the objectives as
logical propositions. The DCS algorithm is in charge of ex-
ploring all the possible cases to automatically achieve the
objectives without conflict. LINC combined with H/BZR
enforces all the objectives without conflict using one single
rule that invokes the step. This rule can replace the set of
rules in which several rules read the same values at the same
instant.
Controlling the logical behaviour of a large system using
one single rule would be limiting. A solution is to first de-
compose the system into sub-systems and then, design a
global automaton for each sub-system. If the sub-systems
share objectives, their automata have to communicate and
will be composed. This can cause expensive DCS. To deal
with this problem, the potential modular DCS in H/BZR [6]
can be exploited.
In LINC, communication errors and hardware failures are
handled by transactions that perform alternative actions and
raise alerts only if no alternative action is possible [10]. In
addition, put actions on actuators may use different com-
munication protocols if several are available. Hence, a put
fails only if all the communication links to the target actua-
tor are down. To deal with such situations, it is possible to
configure the rule such that it will try several times to see if
a communication has become possible.
4. CASE STUDY
Let us consider an office that consists of a room with sev-
eral actuators (i.e. a window, a shutter, a door, a lamp, a
mechanical ventilation and a reversible air conditioner) and
a set of sensors (i.e. presence, luminosity, CO2, noise, tem-
perature). Other sensors are installed outside the room to
enquire outdoor conditions. Information about the meetings
(day, time, features) that will be held in the office can be ob-
tained through a specific agenda. The aim of the case study
is to control the office, to achieve the following objectives:
• For comfort, when a presence is detected, the lumi-
nosity must be between 500 and 600 lux and the noise
level must be lower than 80 dB.
• For comfort, when a presence is detected and the tem-
perature is lower than 17◦C (resp. greater than 27◦C),
the room must be heated (resp. cooled).
• For air quality, the room must be ventilated when a
presence is detected and the CO2 exceeds 800 ppm.
• For energy savings, natural lighting, ventilation, heat-
ing and cooling are preferred to artificial lighting, ven-
tilation, heating and cooling.
• For confidentiality, the office must be completely closed
during a confidential meeting.
• For air quality, the room must be quickly ventilated
between two meetings separated by less than 30 min.
• For air quality, the room must not be polluted by
pollen or outdoor CO2.
To demonstrate the interest of our approach, the case
study is first implemented in LINC without H/BZR. Then,
our approach is used and a comparison is done.
4.1 Development Using LINC
32 rules were first written to control the office. These rules
are grouped in five sets: Temperature, Air quality, Noise,
Luminosity and Confidentiality. The rules of each set
verify relevant conditions and send appropriate commands
to specific actuators. The set of rules written to control
the office contains twenty nine potential conflicts. Three
examples of conflicts are:
• Window: open for cooling and close for confidentiality;
• Window: open for heating and close for outdoor CO2;
• Shutter: open for light and close for confidentiality.
All the conflicts were manually avoided. For every poten-
tial conflict, one or more rd operations were added in the
precondition of the involved rules to ensure that they will
not be triggered at the same time. For instance, let us con-
sider the following rules. R1 closes the window to reduce
noise (from outdoor) in the room. R2 opens the window
for natural ventilation. R3 switches on the HVAC if natural
ventilation is not possible (e.g. polluted outdoor air). If the
room is occupied, the CO2 level is high, the outdoor air is
not polluted and the outdoor noise is high, there will be a
conflict between R1 and R2 on the window. To solve this
conflict, R2 must verify if the outdoor noise is normal before
opening the window. Another rule R4 is then required to
switch on the HVAC, if there is noise outside, because the
window will not be opened and R3 will not be triggered (i.e.
natural ventilation is possible).
At the end, 41 additional conditions were added on 11
rules (34.37%) and 14 rules were added (43.75%).
4.2 Development using H/BZR and LINC
The office is first designed using H/BZR and discrete con-
troller synthesis. Then, the H/BZR program is compiled
and the step is invoked in a LINC rule.
The automaton of the office is obtained by the paral-
lel composition of automata describing the behaviours of a
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Figure 2: Shutter and Agenda automaton
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# other automata
Figure 3: Office node for DCS
room, a lamp, a shutter, a door, a reversible air-conditioner
(RAC), a mechanical ventilation (MV), a window and an
agenda. Fig. 2a presents the automaton of the shutter. This
automaton has two states Closed and Opened and two tran-
sitions. At each state, two variables lum and air are as-
sociated to respectively specify the luminosity provided by
the shutter and if it allows air to pass. For instance, when
the shutter is opened, it provides a luminosity equal to the
outdoor luminosity (olum) and allows air to pass. When the
variable r_open is true, the automaton goes from the state
Closed to Opened and produces the command open. Fig. 2b
presents the agenda automaton. This automaton has three
states: Nomeeting, Meeting and Between2. These states al-
low to know: if there is a meeting or no and if a meeting
will be held in less than 30 min, after a previous meeting.
Fig. 3 presents the main node of the H/BZR program: the
office automaton. This automaton takes as parameter all
sensor values and meetings information. It returns the com-
mands to send to the different actuators. This automaton is
used with DCS to enforce the objectives. The objectives are
first formalised as logical propositions. For instance, the
first proposition (presence → lum in [500,600]) means
that when presence is true, luminosity must be in the range
[500,600]. Then, a contract is defined to enforce these
logical propositions with a set of controllable variables as-
sociated to automata transitions. For instance, in shutter
automaton, r_open and r_close are controllable variables.
H/BZR was able to enforce the objectives without conflict.
The step function generated by the compilation of the
H/BZR program was invoked in one LINC rule following
the execution scheme presented in Listing 2.
4.3 Discussion on the case study
Controlling the office in LINC combined with H/BZR just
required to design 8 automata and formalise the objectives
as logical propositions. This generated one rule that invokes
the step and enforces the objectives without conflict.
In LINC, the office was first controlled using 32 rules that
can be distributed. However, to avoid conflicts between the
rules, it was required to add additional conditions on several
rules. For instance, five conditions were added on the rule
that opens the window and the shutter to heat the room.
Avoiding conflicts also required to add several rules and
make sure that all the necessary rules were added.
In this case study, the luminosity is affected by two actu-
ators involved only in few other objectives (i.e. lamp, shut-
ter). Hence, the office control could be divided in two sub-
systems (i.e. luminosity, Temperature-CO2-Noise) that
could be controlled separately. However, these sub-systems
are not independent. They share an objective (related to
confidentiality) and a variable (air provided by the shutter).
Therefore, the they must communicate. This could be done
with a parallel composition of their automata with DCS or
through modular DCS [6] which is less expensive.
5. RELATED WORK
In [9], the authors enhance the verification capabilities of
the iLAND middleware, through Petri nets, to increase the
reliability of adaptive real time distributed systems. Our
approach, improves the reliability of the middleware LINC
with discrete controller synthesis (DCS) instead of verifica-
tion. The advantage of DCS compared to verification is it
prevents developers from manually enforcing properties on
the system behaviour and verifying if they are satisfied. In-
deed, DCS automatically constrains the system behaviour
and enforces the target properties, if a solution exists.
In [14], the authors detect and solve conflicts among a set
of rules in order to provide behavioural reliability in a service
oriented middleware named aWESoME. Transactional reli-
ability should be added to their approach in order to ensure
that the services will be properly delivered.
In [13], the authors propose a model-checking based ap-
proach for the reliability of IoT middleware. The system be-
haviour is modelled using automata and a set of properties
are verified. If a target property is not satisfied, the counter-
example given by the model-checker is used to modify the
model and verify it again. In our approach, properties are
automatically enforced through DCS, if feasible.
In [11], the authors propose behavioural reliability in a
policy based system. A constraint solver is used to detect if
a new policy and an existing one can be triggered at the same
instant. For each pair of policies that can be triggered simul-
taneously, their effects on the environment are compared to
detect a potential conflict that has to be solved by the user
before execution. In our approach, users are not required to
solve conflicts (this is automatically done) and transactional
execution is also provided to avoid inconsistencies.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed an approach that combines trans-
actional and behavioural reliability in adaptive middleware.
This prevents from inconsistencies, resulting from commu-
nication errors or hardware failures, and conflicting actions.
The approach was implemented using the middleware LINC
and the automata based language H/BZR. The paper first
studied LINC and H/BZR. Then, it explained how they are
combined and discussed their combination. Then, the pa-
per illustrated the proposed implementation through a case
study, in the field of building automation. The case study
was discussed to show the advantages of the approach.
An important perspective of this work is to improve the
handling of communication errors and hardware failures.
Another perspective is to automatise the decomposition of a
system into different sub-systems, depending on the objec-
tives to achieve. These sub-systems will then be controlled
seperately and coordinated through modular DCS.
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